In one line: a redesign that moves :visited privacy from "lie to JavaScript" to "keep a separate history per site in the first place." Chrome 136 shipped it, the same algorithm now sits in an appendix of Selectors Level 4, and the discussion has moved on to removing the getComputedStyle lie that has been in place since 2010.

Why this, why now

The problem

Twenty years of history sniffing

:visited takes a piece of browser-internal state ("has the user been to this URL?") and exposes it visually through page-authored CSS. If any site could read that state, this attack would work:

// The classic pre-2010 attack (does not work in current browsers)
const candidates = ["https://bank.example/", "https://clinic.example/", /* ... */];
for (const url of candidates) {
  const a = document.createElement("a");
  a.href = url;
  document.body.append(a);
  if (getComputedStyle(a).color === "rgb(128, 0, 128)") {
    report(url); // the user has visited this site
  }
}

The 2010 mitigation: real pixels, fake answers

L. David Baron (Mozilla) wrote up a mitigation in 2010 that browsers then adopted. It had three parts:

  1. getComputedStyle and related APIs answer as if every link were unvisited.
  2. :visited may only change colors: color, background-color, border-*-color, outline-color, column-rule-color, and, under conditions, fill/stroke. Alpha comes from the unvisited style.
  3. Sibling combinators such as :visited + span always treat the link as unvisited.

The reason is that any layout or image-loading difference could be measured. But the result is double bookkeeping: true pixels on screen, false answers to queries. User-interaction, timing, and pixel-color leaks kept being found afterwards. The Selectors 4 appendix calls it "an arms race that can't be won." Engines also had to carry "two parallel realities" of colors, which is painful, for example when handling transitions.

The root cause

The real issue was that history was a single list shared by every site. A link to B that you clicked on site A would also show as purple on an unrelated site, Evil. If Evil could observe "is it purple?" by any means, your behavior on A leaked to Evil.

How it works

The triple key

Chrome 136 (stable 2025-04-29) changed the :visited hash table so it is keyed by three things: