https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2l97QtLcGiU

From the Senate hearing "Rogue AI: Securing the Homeland Against AI Agent Attacks" held on September 30, 2026, here is the transcript of Professor Paul Ohm's opening statement [00:25:30]:

Professor Paul Ohm:

"Thank you, Chairman Hawley, Ranking Member Kim, and members of the subcommittee and committee. I appreciate this opportunity to be with you today to talk about what the law says about cyberattacks launched by AI.

If you take any of the lengthy reports that have summarized what happened at OpenAI in July and August, and you simply search for the words ‘AI agent’ and you replace them with the words ‘OpenAI employee,’ the document you would be left with would read like a criminal indictment containing the defendant's own confession of guilt. It would leave little doubt that OpenAI and their employees would be guilty of federal crimes and liable to victims. Yet, it's not so clear that these legal conclusions hold when machines are doing the hacking rather than humans. This reveals worrisome gaps in our laws, and I'm here to share some thoughts on how to close these gaps.

I would like to make three points: on our goals, on the current legal landscape, and on new laws we should consider.

Point Number One: On Goals

In my written statement, I proposed five goals for an effective legal response, but let me focus on perhaps the most important one: we must change the incentives. Well-designed legal frameworks can change the behavior of actors in this industry who seem locked in a socially perilous race of careless competition. The right laws and the right enforcement strategies might spur industry to take new, meaningful steps to protect the public from avoidable and serious harm.

Point Number Two: Our Current Laws Are a Good Start, But Only If We Protect Them

Start with state tort law. When AI companies lose control of their AI agents, their victims can sue them for negligence and products liability. The genius of the centuries-old common law system is that it is flexible and adaptable enough to apply time-tested liability principles in new and complex situations. We can also turn to state and federal unfair and deceptive acts and practices laws, like Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. It seems likely to me that the FTC or a state attorney general will be able to prove that OpenAI's attacks constituted unfair and deceptive acts or practices if they have the resources and the will to act. These are two of the best avenues we have today, and the worst thing Congress can do, in my opinion, is enact state law preemption or a moratorium, depriving the right of victims of attacks like these from testing their claims in state court.

Point Number Three: We Need New Laws That Meet This Critical Moment

We cannot, unfortunately, wait years for a fully developed AI governance law to spring like Athena from the heads of Congress. Instead, we should work iteratively and piece-by-piece. Congress or states should consider laws imposing strict liability for developers and deployers of AI agents that cause physical injury, death, or loss of critical infrastructure. In the past, we've applied strict liability when faced with a potent mix similar to today: of complex new technological innovation, great benefits, immature industrial controls, and the prospect of significant damages. We did this with large reservoirs of water; we did this with early commercial aviation. We have walked this path before; we can do so again.

We also need new forms of regulatory governance. Once again, we can turn first to the states. States are testing innovative new forms of AI regulation, including laws that specifically regulate the developers of frontier models and AI agents. So once again, Congress should reaffirm and support the vital part the states play as our laboratories of democracy.

Finally, there is an important role to be played by criminal law. Because OpenAI's agents were bits of code lacking human intent, although they committed quintessentially criminal acts of computer hacking, they leave us without a criminal to charge. And while we must reserve a role for the criminal law in our response, the criminal law can be a blunt instrument, so we must act here with care—and I'm happy to talk at greater length about that generally, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act specifically, during your questions.

In closing, the people of this country are terrified, and they feel disempowered by the alarming news of the past few months. They are turning to you, their elected representatives, for answers. Too often, these AI safety and control debates happen among a limited number of tech industry executives and employees who draw on a narrow set of experience and expertise. The law can bring the outside in by including judges, juries, victims, legislators, policymakers, and ordinary people in a conversation that too often can seem insular, circular, and stalled. New voices with different points of view may be just what we need to make progress.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions."

(Source: Senate Committee on Homeland Security Hearing)[00:25:30])

Here is the transcript of Daniel Kokotajlo's opening statement from the Senate hearing on Rogue AI: Securing the Homeland Against AI Agent Attacks ([36:24]):

Chairman Hawley, Ranking Member Kim, and members of the subcommittee: