October 29, 2026
On 29 October 2026, signing access to Binance hot wallets was used to move about $6.3B out of 15 wallets across eight chains: Ethereum, Bitcoin, TRON, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Optimism, Base and Polygon. No smart contract was exploited. Every theft was a valid transaction signed by a Binance hot-wallet key.
The largest loss came from Binance 14 on Ethereum. Its key signed 50 EIP-7702 authorizations that delegated the wallet to an attacker contract, and one sweep() call at 20:24:23 UTC moved about $2.53B. The delegation then let the attacker drain the wallet three more times and pull 823M USDC out of a smart account that Binance 14 owns, until Binance removed it at 00:10:35 UTC on 30 October.
Keys on Avalanche and Polygon signed for the attacker again at 23:04 UTC, nearly three hours after the first theft. Tether and Circle have frozen about $2.6B in stablecoins, and the rest, mostly ETH, BTC and TRX, is held by the attacker. How the attacker obtained signing access has not been confirmed. Binance has said user funds are completely safe.
All times are UTC. Figures come from on-chain data as of 00:20 UTC on 30 October, and the addresses and transaction hashes are in the appendix.
Exchange hot wallets are the online accounts an exchange uses to pay out withdrawals and collect swept deposits. They sign around the clock, often thousands of transfers a day, so their keys have to be reachable by automated signing systems at all times. On EVM chains these wallets are usually externally owned accounts (EOAs): addresses with no code, where any valid signature from the key moves funds.
EIP-7702, live on Ethereum since the Pectra upgrade in May 2025, lets an EOA point its code at a smart contract. The mechanics matter for what follows:
0xef0100 followed by the contract address. Any call to the EOA then runs that contract's logic with full access to the account's balances, until the EOA signs a new authorization that replaces it or points it at the zero address.For a retail wallet this enables batching and gas sponsorship. For a hot wallet whose key is compromised, it means an attacker can turn one signature into standing control of the account.
The attacker prepared for about 37 hours, all of it on public chains.
0x7C8601d4645b93cea45F71e118A729332e6B5CA0 and two helper wallets were funded only through Tornado Cash. There were six withdrawals through public relayers between 07:39 on 28 October and 14:54 on 29 October, about 1.49 ETH in total. At 18:20 on 29 October a helper sent the operator 1.08 ETH for gas.0x19beE294A6DaAb49c9e5Ab69A5Da6C035C70f2bf). At 15:59:11 it deployed the version later used on Binance, 0x63e842B054Bd624a465454D533C33F573e9c6fAe. It is unverified, about 1.6 KB of Solidity 0.8.28 bytecode, and hardcodes the operator as its only authorized caller.sweep(address,address[]) sends the account's ETH and every listed token to a recipient and leaves 1 ETH behind for gas. withdrawETH and withdrawToken move single assets. A fourth selector, 0x043ff9d2, makes the delegated account call execute(address,uint256,bytes) on another contract, which mattered 17 minutes after the main sweep.