October 29, 2026

Exploit Summary

On 29 October 2026, signing access to Binance hot wallets was used to move about $6.3B out of 15 wallets across eight chains: Ethereum, Bitcoin, TRON, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Optimism, Base and Polygon. No smart contract was exploited. Every theft was a valid transaction signed by a Binance hot-wallet key.

The largest loss came from Binance 14 on Ethereum. Its key signed 50 EIP-7702 authorizations that delegated the wallet to an attacker contract, and one sweep() call at 20:24:23 UTC moved about $2.53B. The delegation then let the attacker drain the wallet three more times and pull 823M USDC out of a smart account that Binance 14 owns, until Binance removed it at 00:10:35 UTC on 30 October.

Keys on Avalanche and Polygon signed for the attacker again at 23:04 UTC, nearly three hours after the first theft. Tether and Circle have frozen about $2.6B in stablecoins, and the rest, mostly ETH, BTC and TRX, is held by the attacker. How the attacker obtained signing access has not been confirmed. Binance has said user funds are completely safe.

All times are UTC. Figures come from on-chain data as of 00:20 UTC on 30 October, and the addresses and transaction hashes are in the appendix.

Context: Hot Wallets, Signing Keys, and EIP-7702 Delegation

Exchange hot wallets are the online accounts an exchange uses to pay out withdrawals and collect swept deposits. They sign around the clock, often thousands of transfers a day, so their keys have to be reachable by automated signing systems at all times. On EVM chains these wallets are usually externally owned accounts (EOAs): addresses with no code, where any valid signature from the key moves funds.

EIP-7702, live on Ethereum since the Pectra upgrade in May 2025, lets an EOA point its code at a smart contract. The mechanics matter for what follows:

For a retail wallet this enables batching and gas sponsorship. For a hot wallet whose key is compromised, it means an attacker can turn one signature into standing control of the account.

The Exploit: How it Unfolded

1. Preparation

The attacker prepared for about 37 hours, all of it on public chains.