In one line: a redesign that moves
:visitedprivacy from "lie to JavaScript" to "keep a separate history per site in the first place." Chrome 136 shipped it, the same algorithm now sits in an appendix of Selectors Level 4, and the discussion has moved on to removing thegetComputedStylelie that has been in place since 2010.
:visited link partitioning in 2025. I had no idea this was a thing!"/goto?url=…), which breaks :visited, and that Bing turns results purple on hover.:visited no longer works the way it did in 2010. If you style it today, you should be able to explain exactly what turns purple, and where.:visited takes a piece of browser-internal state ("has the user been to this URL?") and exposes it visually through page-authored CSS. If any site could read that state, this attack would work:
// The classic pre-2010 attack (does not work in current browsers)
const candidates = ["https://bank.example/", "https://clinic.example/", /* ... */];
for (const url of candidates) {
const a = document.createElement("a");
a.href = url;
document.body.append(a);
if (getComputedStyle(a).color === "rgb(128, 0, 128)") {
report(url); // the user has visited this site
}
}
L. David Baron (Mozilla) wrote up a mitigation in 2010 that browsers then adopted. It had three parts:
getComputedStyle and related APIs answer as if every link were unvisited.:visited may only change colors: color, background-color, border-*-color, outline-color, column-rule-color, and, under conditions, fill/stroke. Alpha comes from the unvisited style.:visited + span always treat the link as unvisited.The reason is that any layout or image-loading difference could be measured. But the result is double bookkeeping: true pixels on screen, false answers to queries. User-interaction, timing, and pixel-color leaks kept being found afterwards. The Selectors 4 appendix calls it "an arms race that can't be won." Engines also had to carry "two parallel realities" of colors, which is painful, for example when handling transitions.
The real issue was that history was a single list shared by every site. A link to B that you clicked on site A would also show as purple on an unrelated site, Evil. If Evil could observe "is it purple?" by any means, your behavior on A leaked to Evil.
Chrome 136 (stable 2025-04-29) changed the :visited hash table so it is keyed by three things: